This paper considers whether highly concentrated industries are better represented in the political process, as Olson's Logic of Collective Action suggests, and, if they are, whether this is so for the reasons that the Logic claims. It begins with a review and critique of the quantitative literature that has largely tried and failed to substantiate Olson's view. The bulk of the paper consists of five longitudinal case studies of firms that dominate or have dominated industries: IBM, Intel, Microsoft, America Online, and Cisco. The cases suggest that there is merit to the Olsonian view, but that alone it does not constitute an adequate political theory of the concentrated industry or the dominant firm. Additional variables drawn from organizational and institutional theory need to be incorporated into such a theory, including variables that bear on the allocation of attention, threat perception, and information flow within dominant firms.
oriented to "private goods," such as government contracts that might otherwise be won by competitors. 18 By making the industry the unit of analysis, GMR are unable to rule out the possibility that representation is motivated by intra-industry rivalry.
The other issue is the privileging of opportunity over threat in GMR's exposition.
Industries (and individual firms within them) may take political action in order to mitigate risks or bolster their legitimacy, rather than to secure tangible gains.
Maintenance of the status quo may well be considered a victory for a threatened industry, yet such motivation would not be captured in their framework. cit.. Obviously, the assumption of collective action is a general problem with the Olsonian paradigm. 19 GMR do employ cumulative antitrust indictments and regulation as independent variables that might be construed as proxies for threat, but they do not interpret these variables as such. Two other independent variables, import share and wage rates, are interpreted in something like this fashion. 20 If measured political activity is static, then the five cycles ought to be collapsed to one, which would produce larger confidence intervals. Industrial concentration data are collected by the Census every five years (years that end in 2 and 7) and are released about three years later. GMR might have interpolated, GMR use a measure of industrial concentration that is notoriously problematic. They aggregate data provided by the U.S. Census at the 4-digit SIC level to create measures of the market share of the largest four firms in each 3-digit SIC industry. 21 Yet, even 4-digit industries may not be homogeneous enough to share political interests, much less 3-digit industries. 22 Semiconductor manufacturing, for instance, is a 4-digit industry.
Microprocessors are one of many products made by semiconductor manufacturers. Intel is estimated by most observers to have maintained a roughly 80% market share in microprocessors for the past decade or more, a level of concentration that has regularly drawn scrutiny from U.S. antitrust enforcement authorities and may therefore be considered relevant for political purposes. Yet, the four-firm concentration ratio in this industry at the 4-digit level was only 41% in 1992. Aggregating semiconductor manufacturing with other industries in its 3-digit classification, which encompasses a wide variety of electronic components, would bring the level down much further.
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GMR treat average firm size in addition to industrial concentration as an independent variable that bears on the capacity to overcome barriers to collective action.
"[I]n
Olson's (1965) framework," they write, "the key element is the absolute size of benefits using data from 1977 and 1987 (if these data were available at the time of the research), to get some variation on this independent variable, although this choice, too, has its problems. 21 The larger the number of digits in the SIC scheme, the broader the industry definition. Thus, 2-digit industries include a number of 3-digit industries, and 3-digit industries include a number of 4-digit industries. The SIC system has now been superseded by the NAICS system. 22 Russell J. Pittman and Gregory J. Werden, "The Divergence of SIC Industries from Antitrust Markets," Economic Letters 33: 283-286 (1990) . 23 The Census only produces concentration estimates for manufacturing industries, but estimates from other sources used in the recent Microsoft trial (software is considered to be a service industry, not a manufacturing industry) produced similar measurement debates. GMR make an effort to address this concern by including a dummy variable for the diversity of production. capabilities that the cross-sectional approach misses. In some cases, for instance, representation predates concentration, and it may be that there is some simultaneous causation of the two by another factor, such as leadership. 33 The longitudinal dimension also allows me to explore the notion of representation in ways that are much more subtle than the dichotomous variable used, for example, in probit models.
Another interesting feature of this set of cases is that these firms interact over time.
Microsoft, for instance, was first the partner of and then supplanted IBM as the dominant firm in the operating systems software market. These interactions permit some insights into the "indeterminate" small group dynamics that Olson alludes to. Not all of these interactions are mediated by the market, however. In some cases, one or more of the five firms serve as the reference group for another of the five, even though the firms are not head-to-head competitors. They think of themselves and are thought of by outside observers as being in the same "industry," and therefore they may respond to similar environmental signals or learn from one another.
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The "industry" that these firms belong to, of course, is information technology (IT). IT has at least two features worth noting. One is that the malleability of IT leads to abrupt shifts in competition and in the boundaries of markets. Indeed, it may call into question the concept of industrial concentration, as Microsoft's advocates in its antitrust travails 33 Reverse causation, in which political representation leads to greater concentration, is also a possibility, as in the case of the early AT&T. have argued. 35 IT firms are often simultaneously competitors and collaborators, and that may make it difficult for them to identify collective goods. The other feature is the sector's rapid growth. Processes that take longer to occur and might be more difficult to observe elsewhere in business and politics are easier to observe in this one. There is a parallel to the molecular biologist's fruitfly, which is a popular research subject because it reproduces and mutates rapidly.
While not typical, then, these five cases should enrich the political theory of the firm, especially the dominant firm. These cases may also serve as harbingers of the future.
The knowledge-based economy seems to be characterized by "winner-take-all" markets, 36 in part because it is increasingly infused with IT. Dominant firms in general would become more important if this prediction is borne out, and these future firms would be more likely to resemble the five firms considered here than the behemoths of the "old economy." The capsule histories are presented in the order, roughly speaking, in which the five firms attained dominance: IBM, Intel, Microsoft, AOL, and, finally, Cisco.
37 35 The apparent paradox here is explained by the fact that a firm that is dominant in one market may choose to enter a market which is dominated by another firm. Microsoft, for instance, is the dominant firm in the personal computer software industry, but with the introduction of Microsoft Network (MSN), it challenged AOL in the internet service provision (ISP) market, which AOL dominates. Watson, Jr., was deeply committed to the one-on-one approach to government affairs.
Not until the firm came under severe threat did he consent to hire a consultant to advise IBM management on public policy strategy, and even then the consent was contingent on assurances that the consultant was not a "lobbyist." 39 The threat was mounted by the so- The early phases of the Intel story echo not IBM, but IBM's competitors. Intel entered politics (however one chooses to measure entry) as one member (and not the largest) of an industry with unusually low transaction costs that sought to broaden the scope of conflict in the face of a grave threat from its Japanese rivals. Noyce represented the industry as much as the firm. Like IBM, however, once Intel was mobilized by threat, it soon found political opportunities in pursuit of which its capabilities could be deployed.
Intel assumed command of its key markets in parallel with this political development.
These processes are not causally related, but rather are both results of its leaders' choices.
Unlike its early history, Intel's recent ascension to industrial statesmanship would not have surprised Olson. Secure in its position, it has the slack (or "bandwidth," as Intel executives like to say) to adopt a long-term and broad perspective of its interests. Microsoft's political development bears important similarities to IBM's. Both firms were represented in Washington early in their history, but neither recognized a potentially devastating Schattschneiderian threat in time to head it off. Once the threat finally breached the attention threshold of senior management, the firms responded massively, perhaps even overcompensating. The irony in this parallel stems from the fact that Gates saw IBM as a negative model and was determined not to repeat the mistake, as he perceived it, of becoming distracted from the business by external threats. 68 Although he has now stepped aside as CEO, Gates's imprint is likely to remain on Microsoft, just as
Watson's did on IBM. Nonetheless, it seems likely that, having adapated to the norms of Washington and moved far toward putting its antitrust problems behind it, Microsoft will begin to play the "statesman" role that IBM played in its heyday and Intel still plays. Vradenburg's influence was felt immediately. Rather than "making it up as we went along," 79 AOL's government affairs unit became more careful and more strategic in its choice of issues, positions, and tactics. AOL took the lead in trying to organize collective action on behalf of the new industry, separating out issues unique to the firm from those for which costs might be shared. AOL's efforts to create an entity that could "speak for the Internet," however, never bore fruit. Even though AOL spent "serious money" and some of Case's time on the effort, key potential member firms proved unable to agree on a set of policy priorities and positions. The chaotic nature of the medium and confusion over its commercial potential contributed to the stalemate, but mistrust of the dominant firm in the industry seems to have played an important role as well. Multiple measures for representation. My first conclusion is methodological.
Representation is a complex phenomenon that ought to be assessed with information that Organizational and institutional variables: leadership attention. To understand why dominant firms more often follow their competitors in entering the Washington interest organization universe than lead them, one must go beyond the rational actor model of the firm. 98 The decision to enter politics requires approval from senior managers, including the CEO, people whose attention to non-market issues is usually very limited. The case studies point to variations in the threshold that non-market threats and opportunities must breach before senior executives pay attention to them. Some portion of that variation may simply be accounted for by differences in managerial "taste" for politics. John
Chambers' passion contrasts sharply with Bill Gates' disdain. Although such differences could reasonably be considered noise in a large n study, it might be worthwhile experimenting with variables that measure some personal characteristic of the CEO, perhaps something as simple as whether he or she is the founder of the firm on the premise that CEOs hired externally are more likely to have been exposed to significant non-market issues in previous positions.
Organizational and institutional variables: threat perception. While variations in
"taste" might be equally relevant to managerial responses to threats or opportunities, this set of cases suggest that threats are more likely to attract attention than opportunities.
Threat perception, in turn, may depend on the reference groups to whom senior managers paid attention and the lessons they drew from them. 99 Gates viewed IBM's reaction to its antitrust case, which included a large investment in political capabilities, as helping to render it vulnerable to later competitors, including his own firm. He sought to avoid making the same mistake by keeping Microsoft relatively aloof from Washington.
Chambers may have taken Microsoft's trouble with the antitrust authorities as a signal that his firm should avoid that mistake and be certain to build strong relationships with public officials. Steve Case seems to have switched his reference group from the hightechnology industry to the media industry while AOL headed off liability for content flowing through its network. The new reference group was a regulated industry with a long tradition of activism in Washington, and the switch may have contributed to the hiring of a high-level manager for public policy from outside the firm. Such differences in threat perception do not seem easily amenable to quantitative research.
Organizational and institutional variables: information flows. Attention and perception
at the top of an organization should not be conceived of as purely individual phenomena, of course. The information that flows to the holders of senior positions is significantly influenced by structural factors. In the case studies, the establishment of a government affairs staff at headquarters and a Washington office tended to make executive decisionmakers more sensitive to political threats and much more aware of political opportunities.
Formal reporting channels for these entities and decision-making processes may also shape political representation, especially within dominant firms. Don't throw out the baby. None of the foregoing should be taken to mean that we should discard the Olsonian hypothesis. The case studies provide some evidence in support of it.
When IBM was at the peak of its power, for instance, some of its competitors let it do the talking for them in Washington. Similarly, after AOL achieved a dominant position in the ISP market, it defined its main policy objective to be building confidence in the Internet as a medium and made significant investments to try to secure that elusive collective good. Intel, too, once it had secured its commanding position in the market, sought collective goods, such as large-scale deployment of broadband service, that would benefit many other firms as well as itself. Moreover, the Olsonian framework, conceived of more broadly, helps to make sense of other elements of some of these cases that do not conform to the narrow hypothesis. Intel's entry into politics when it was far from dominant, for instance, was eased by the low transaction costs that faced the Silicon
Valley community in organizing collectively; the same was true for Cisco a couple of decades later. My argument is intended to foster theoretical and methodological pluralism in the study of business and politics, not to substitute one monopoly for another.
Path dependence. The case studies suggest that early choices may leave a long-lasting imprint on a firm's political development. IBM and Intel, for instance, have not participated fully in the campaign finance system. IBM's entry into politics coincided with the Watergate backlash of the mid-1970s, and the company sought to establish beyond a doubt that it was clean. This commitment, which was strongly endorsed by CEO Watson, Jr., put IBM on a path that emphasized in-house expertise deployed through lobbyists as the firm's key political asset. Had it entered in the 1990s, as
Microsoft, AOL, and Cisco did, it seems likely that IBM's path would have been different. Intel's entry came in between these two generations, and it fits in between in terms of campaign contributions, too, maintaining a PAC, but not contributing soft money to the national parties. Each firm's organizational culture and the perceptions of it in the Washington environment help to reduce the chances it will switch paths in this aspect of its behavior.
The question of path dependence leads to two final questions that might be asked about the politics of dominant firms: does their investment in political capabilities contribute to the maintenance of their market position? For those firms that entered politics before they achieved dominance, the question is even more pointed: did they achieve that position in part because of this investment? AOL and Intel fall into the latter category, and the evidence in these cases suggests that the answer to the second question is negative. However, their relatively early entrance into politics may be correlated with subsequent success in a non-trivial way; political and market success may be products of strategically broad-minded management teams.
My hunch is that the answer to the first question is "yes," and that provisional answer brings me back once again to Olson. Dominant firms are natural targets for non-market threats, whether from competitors or from societal forces. Political capabilities help these firms to blunt or even avoid such threats. Although dominant firms may not be first movers in the way that Olson thought they should be, they seem often to be fast second movers. Even if they overcompensate for a late start, the expense of building political capabilities is modest enough that paying extra is of little concern in the long run (as long as the firm's interlocutors in Washington perceive it as a credible actor). Although the IBM case shows that such capabilities are not sufficient to maintain dominance indefinitely, they may well be necessary, as Microsoft seems to have found out.
Watching Cisco over the next few years may provide a test of this theory.
